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The world is, clearly, becoming a more restive place.  2011 saw popular uprisings taking place across the Arab World, most notably in Tunisia, Libya and Syria as well as sustained anti-austerity protests in Europe, most notably in Spain and Greece.  Parallel to this we saw popular demonstrations for greater democracy in Russia and Iran, protests for social justice in Israel as well as the emergence of the “Occupy” Movement with high profile protests around Wall Street and the City of London.

What these protests have in common is what all protests have in common.  Like their historical antecedents our contemporary uprisings are concerned with power and how it is being exercised.   This factor of all uprisings, ever, is so axiomatic that it hardly bears mentioning - except in that it enables us, paradoxically, to locate what is specific about those from our era.

But before attempting to do that lets pin down the more particular ‘casus belli’ that the Occupy Movement, the protests on Tahrir Square or in Madrid might have in common - for its certainly the case that these are different orders of protest with very different aims both in terms of register and effect.  The desire to reform a financial system is, only at the theoretical level, similar to the desire to overthrow a dictatorship and the two actions involve a very different level of risk and commitment.  But there are particular features with all the protests of 2011 that do enable them to be grouped and considered together - the protests have emerged from a broad section of society, they have shown a large involvement of the middle classes in their respective countries and have been directed specifically at the political class and in particular at its use of power.   There is an inevitable temptation to reach for historical antecedents that appear to prefigure some of these conditions.  A banking crisis and economic downturn in Europe has prompted many to fear the spectre of the 1930’s may be back to haunt us. But early 21st century Europe is not Europe in the 1930s.  A re-reading of Hannah Arendt is instructive on this point in helping us identify how endemic Islamaphobia has not served the function that endemic anti-Semitism did in setting a society’s cultural prejudices within the framework of political economy.1  The protests against the banking sector, or against governments which have chosen to place the well-being of their banks over the well-being of their citizens, have not given rise to significant right-wing popularism.  A recognised feature of the European anti-austerity protests is that they have originated from within liberal and civil society rather than the extreme right, although racist parties have fared well in other European countries.  The continuing rise of an Islamaphobic right in the Netherlands and Finland – ie countries which have not been the subject of bond market ‘nervousness’ (or profiteering to call it by its real name) underscores the level of disconnect between Europe’s residual racist tendencies and the economic and political crisis which has engulfed the Mediterranean ‘periphery’.  And if this is not the 1930s its not 1845 either, although again the parallels are tempting.  

The historian Eric Hobsbawn spoke recently about the similarities between the Arab Spring and those European uprisings that occurred at the end of the period covered by his 1963 work, The Age of Revolutions, 1789-1845.2  Looking at the recent history of those countries involved in the Arab Spring you can see his point. Mass urbanisation over a fairly short historical period, the shift from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial economy, increasing literacy and of course channels for communication, with that telltale growth of an educated middle class.  It might seem that all we were waiting for was a potato famine.  But the Arab Spring didn’t require the dislocation of mass starvation to drive political change. It was a different kind of hunger and its concrete demands are of an altogether different order.

Flick back to the first paragraph with its Uprisings, 2011 list.  It’s noteworthy perhaps that, very unlike 1845, there are no protests for national liberation or self-determination in that list.  Whilst 2011 challenged the make up and practice of various governmental forms it left the notion of national boundaries unchallenged.  This is not a period of Imperial disintegration.  Even given an economic crisis that is now in its fourth year secessionist tendencies within the European Union (excluding the UK) remain outside of the political mainstream. Those conflicts globally which stem from independence movements have remained static (and usually in complete stasis) during 2011 and whilst it remains to be seen if tribal and sectarian divisions in Libya and Syria will escalate into conflicts that lead to national fragmentation its only in the latter case that these questions have played a significant part in recent political unrest.3 Iraq of course is also dealing with intense sectarian violence but the recent history of invasion and occupation mean that its domestic strife can’t usefully be considered as forming a part of the Arab Spring and, contrary to what Dick Cheney might assert, has clearly formed no inspiration for it.4
 
So if those drivers of political conflict have not been potato famines, or the desire for national selfhood, or the renewed outbreak of political modernism in the form of fascism or communism then what has been the specific meaning of this widespread assault on political authority?

The last forty years have seen shifts in wealth distribution, as measured by the Gini Coefficient, which have tended to benefit wealthier citizens at the expense of poorer ones.  This has been evident in industrialized nations like the UK, Germany and USA as well as post-Communist states like Russia, Poland and Bulgaria.  It has happened in China and in Brazil.5 With one or two exceptions it has been a near global fact that the share of national wealth is less equal for people under 35 years of age than it was for their parent’s generation.  Notwithstanding a background of increasing overall wealth, again a common factor for OECD economies, there is now a generation or two that have witnessed the palpable effects of newly created economic elites within their societies.  Wilkinson and Pickett in The Spirit Level have described the socially corrosive effects of increasing inequality within countries.6  It doesn’t seem unreasonable to assume by extension that the corrosive effects of inequality on the body politic should also be detected in the relationship between the citizens and the state.  But even this observation is somehow not enough to nail the grounds of the 2011 protests  – even though it dovetails so conveniently with that narrative of a disenchanted middle class - a social strata that is assumed to have expanded globally in the past forty years just as the share of overall wealth has become more concentrated in the accounts and share holdings of the rich.  High levels of youth unemployment have been cited in UN reports as one of the dangers facing the Arab world but those Arab dictatorships which possess it have historically been very adept at buying off their populations with the wealth that petro-industry brings.7  One can be cynical about the long-term success of this state bribery.  Certainly the Gulf nobility’s deft avoidance of revolution (via an oppression + concessions strategy) was not emulated in Libya where high scores on the Human Development Index did not prevent Gaddafi’s people rising up against him.8 But the language of these conflicts is instructive – the calls that have risen from numerous city squares have not been for ‘equality’ so much as for ‘justice’ and ‘freedom.’  Social inequality might provide the context across national situations for disenchantment but is only a factor and not a vector of this change.  It might be better understood as another effect, like the protests themselves, of globalisation.

Coterminous with the concentration of wealth in the pockets of a smaller portion of national populations has been the emergence of globalisation, that joint enterprise of private global capital and state global trade agreements.   The effects of globalisation has been felt most acutely in developing nations (by which we are now mainly talking about Africa and parts of South America) where local producers have often failed to compete against products from international firms in a process of economic ‘consolidation’.  For emerging nations (especially the BRICs group) it has meant rapid economic growth and in developed nations has subsidised the credit-fuelled illusion that in various ways led to the Euro crisis.  These direct economic effects have been accompanied by the arrival of certain ideological precepts particularly in regard to how capital should employ labour and more fundamentally to what labour should be.

Globalisation requires a quality that it calls ‘flexibility’, though we have to be careful not to take this term at face value – implying as it does both physical adaptability and personal reasonableness.  Flexibility in this context actually refers to things like a worker’s willingness to work varying shifts, on short-term contracts, to relocate to different geographical locations, to be able to swap between different roles and levels of responsibility, to take pay cuts and pay freezes when deemed necessary etc.  It’s a measure of the extent to which a worker will do absolutely everything an employer might ask of them limited only by what the employer, and not the worker, considers to be a reasonable request.  You might think of it as a kind of ‘slavery coefficient’ – absolute worker flexibility being a condition of absolute slavery.  The ideological mission of globalisation has been to shift the values of this coefficient through their ability to shift production between nations and by using the threat of this action to create a psychological context in which the threat of unemployment becomes a kind of natural disaster, and your ‘flexibility’ becomes a form of incantation against its manifestation.

What’s important in all of this is to generate the sense amongst the population that they are positioned not in the context of the people they see around them but in the context of a global marketplace where others are either competing directly for their jobs or for a share of the market for the products they produce and that, in both cases, their livelihoods are under threat.  The practical demands of ‘flexibility’ require the inducement of fear to ensure compliance just as the international system of globalisation has been underpinned by intra-national contracts and treaties that effectively closed off avenues for labour to defend its conditions.   As late as the 1970s personal employment security might have been realised via strong unions and demands for trade restrictions.  Today such calls are widely perceived as suicidal – globalisation doesn’t permit it.   Again its important to separate the psychological effects of all this.  For whilst governments who are signatories to free trade agreements are also apt to bend or break the rules for domestic political or economic advantage, the narrative their populations must absorb is one where their own economic future continues to depend on their status as a flexible workforce.

But this wheel doesn’t stop turning and, whilst we might be prepared to equate globalisation’s idea of flexibility with a kind of slavery, the participants of the 2011 protests don’t look anything like slaves.  There are reciprocal effects at play and the law of unforeseen consequences is, as ever, present.

When global capital wants a more flexible workforce – ie more mobile, less entitled, a planet of hired hands – it doesn’t foresee the reciprocal changes to the psychological landscape within which labour now operates.  Once the social constructs around employment are removed, or their structures are diminished, the nature of labour is similarly transformed at the psychological as well as the material level.  That is to say that just as capital has shifted its posture towards hired labour so has the individual shifted their attitude towards capital.  In forcing ‘flexibility’ onto a population capital has established an environment in which the individual’s investment in the interests of capital are reduced in proportion to their loss of economic security.  Slaves, especially slaves on short-term contracts, don’t have much of an investment in the well being of the Pharaoh. 

We can recognise that one of the shifts that has resulted from the globalisation’s fetish for flexibility is that an individual’s life time income has also become diversified and that a person’s income is more likely now to be produced from multiple sources, sometime concurrently, than was the case a few generations ago.  But capital pays a cost for this new flexibility as it refigures itself not as ‘employer’ but consumer – and the buying and selling of labour shifts from being a philosophical (ie Marxist) reading of the relationship between labour and capital to its publicly announced formation.  The cost that capital pays is, initially psychological and might be surmised, on the part of labour as  “you don’t love us…. well, we don’t love you either”. The historic retreat of the post-war compact, evident even in countries like Germany, generates one of the economic preconditions for a culture of distribution.   Here the worker must understand that their ability to prosper rests to some extent on their capacity as a distributor of human goods.  If space has been created by globalisation’s loosening of the social space of employment (which required a level of reliability now absent) it is the culture of the distributor that has emerged to fill this space.

This is the curious factor of the 2011 uprisings.  For whilst all historical precedents, almost any kind of protest imaginable, must have at its heart a contest over the distribution of power, in our period it is the fact of distribution itself which provides the underlying motor for the widespread challenges to political authority.

Economic shifts have found their cognate within culture in the growth of new kinds of networked social space in which the act of distribution is also the defining factor.   One can detect this paradigm within language as well as sense its philosophical ramifications on how the network brings about changes in people’s ability to conceive of one another.  The idea of distribution is at the core of social media, seemingly hard wired into its psychological form.  Posting, the term we now use for employing network protocols to transfer information from one device to another via a hypertext server, hints at the users understanding of their act in relation to distribution.  We never used to post email (although language would have permitted it) and chose to send something when we knew to where it was primarily going.  By contrast posting implies a plurality of unknown readers, a social group beyond our immediate knowledge and posting is what you do on Facebook or to YouTube, its how you put stuff up on a blog or on a forum.   It doesn’t matter if we’re talking about the video of a first born child, or some cartoon a friend sent you, or a clip found on a news channel – verbally and imaginatively one might argue we no longer differentiate between these kinds of materials – if it passes a certain individual test  (the poster feels its ok to post it) then the act of distribution occurs. The co-evolution of an economic structure that treats the worker as a distributor of their own labour with a cultural paradigm where distribution rather than consumption defines the ground level of participation presents a weird symmetry without causality.  In both cases the classic ‘means of production and distribution’ have somehow either merged, or the differences between them have begun to blur.

The same features of distribution are evident in the way music is produced for whilst there are still numerous recording studios they are greatly outnumbered by laptops with compositional software.  Music has, of course, always been distributed as product to the consumer.  But its structures of distribution are now themselves, distributed.  Record labels still exist to promote major names but it costs less than $40 to put an album on iTunes and there exists a large number of internet based companies who offer to do so within 48 hours.  This de-concentration of information and utility is observable in publishing and photography, it affects translation services and DIY advice, language learning and consumer information.   Even points where information appears ‘concentrated’ in the digital age – we might think of a sites like Wikipedia or YouTube - are defined by a multiplicity of positions which act upon one another.  Indeed the phrase  “This article relies largely or entirely upon a single source” is, in the Wiki world, meant to alert us to something that is potentially untrustworthy.  The singular point of utterance becomes a site of suspicion.   Its seems so logical that an encyclopaedia should be editable by everyone – its, after all, an encyclopaedia – that its starts to feel odd it would ever have been otherwise.  As an emblematic assault on the idea that authority must issue from forms of concentration, Wikipedia prefigures within ideologies of knowledge something very close to the events of Tahrir Square – a mass gesture that swept away an entrenched regime. 

Walter Benjamin of course got here first in discussing how changes in modes of perception have social as well as artistic consequences when a mass populace develops a “sense of the universal equality of things.”  Benjamin’s classic argument that mechanical reproduction delivers a politically progressive and democratic shift in artistic production is premised on the advent of a means of distribution, which replaces the auratic mystification of artistic production and extends its creative freedoms to a broader demographic base.

“For centuries a small number of writers were confronted by many thousands of readers … today there is hardly a gainfully employed European who could not, in principle, find an opportunity to publish somewhere or other comments on his work, grievances, documentary reports, or that sort of thing. Thus, the distinction between author and public is about to lose its basic character.”9
This crisis in authority has informed critical debate in Western Europe ever since. For Benjamin film was the key form.  Not only did it shatter the traditions of art it radically altered modes of visual perception and furthermore had far reaching implications for the wider social structure and for politics.  It is currently within new technologies and their intrinsic modes of distribution and production that we can locate similar effects.   And so, notwithstanding the capacities of YouTube to remove content, “…modern man’s legitimate claim to being reproduced”10  is, we might say, consummated in the user-led age of MPEG video, social media and self-broadcast. 
Perhaps what Benjamin didn’t quite foresee was how this culture of self-broadcast might affect a concept like celebrity.  He bemoans the “phoney spell of a commodity”11 from the commercial film industry, typifying it as the production of personality, and presents no socially or politically positive factors that arise from this particular instance of reproduction only “illusion producing spectacles.” 12  Writing thirty years later Guy Debord presents a more nuanced reading of spectacle and explores how the celebrity offers “the seemingly lived: the star is the object of identification with the shallow seeming life that has to compensate for the fragmented productive specializations which are actually lived.”13  In our own period celebrity has perhaps come to resemble the fragmented form that Debord claimed it compensated for.  The emergence of the YouTube star is an example of this both in the instance of short lived viral fame for particular uploads (and we should note that the mechanisms for this are email, tweets, Facebook and blog postings etc - the viral is axiomatically distributed) as well as creating its own class of YouTube celebrities whose works are viewed by millions. Whilst its clear that an industrial-entertainment complex still exists in order to produce and exploit celebrity as an economic phenomena there is now a shifting body of transient celebrity that sits along side the products of both Holly and Bollywood.  The blogosphere has produced a counterpart effect in terms of journalistic and diaristic writing, as we witness a spreading and a thinning out of what constitutes celebrity.  We are seeing the evolution of that term as fame becomes what Warhol claimed it would and mutates into yet another thread in an altered social fabric.  
Certainly earlier periods were not without means of communication and the distribution of information.  The key difference now is that the availability of the technical and capital requirements is as ubiquitous as an electrical supply.  Thus in an era of distribution a cultural term like ‘celebrity’ loses its exclusively proprietorial relationship with industry and Benjamin’s ‘phoney spell’ has been broken.  
Distribution is now a present feature of how we earn our money, it conditions our experience of cultural production and our expectations of where value might arise. 
This fundamental shift, brought on both by the advent of the internet as well as the spread of computing power which have placed previously unavailable production and communication tools in the hands of ordinary people, is perhaps most keenly observable in the role social media has played in the 2011 protests themselves.  The role of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube in distributing information – both internally within the cohort of protesters as a form of organisation and externally to a global audience as a form of communication – is well recognised. So profound has the utilitarian impact of these technologies been in 2011 that we might misconstrue the deeper significance of their use.  For whilst all the protest movements of the Arab Spring, Occupy, Euro or Russian crises have made use of social media its not the function of these tools that is significant as much as their form.  Their form is global and distributed, immediately local at every point of encounter.    Finding ourselves like the Stone Age man, who discovers that the use of the hand axe goes on to rewire his brain, the tool that is Twitter may have added some functionality to a human’s tongue but it has a far greater effect on their imagination.  This is the real change these technologies are bringing as they reveal to us a landscape in which information is mobile, circulatory and issues simultaneously from as many locations as there are participants.  The landscape generated by distribution has fewer permanent features but infinitely more texture; it’s a landscape that is levelling in front of our eyes.  And when the landscape levels the horizon moves further away.

Concentration is, in an age of distribution, a cultural and political phenomenon, which is suffering from a loss of mystery, to steal of phrase from John Newling, or indeed Beyonce who spoke in 2011 about the way Twitter and mobile phone cameras meant, “Everyone’s a director, everyone’s a photographer.”14 For Beyonce the loss of mystery (and note how she posits it in terms that bring to mind Beuys’ most famous statement) devalues fame by forcing a quotidian visibility upon it.  A similar loss of mystery was suffered in 2010 by state agencies through the activities of Wikileaks as the usually obscured machinations of everyday diplomacy became available in huge quantities.  The effect of Wikileaks, and all the above mentioned factors, is to create a situation where concentrations of power, or wealth, or influence start to appear not simply as unfair but rather, absurd.  Not immoral but, just plain stupid.  The concentration of power is simply abhorrent in an era of distribution.  The data flows, which demark our existence, the sense of a global ants nest that we crawl around in, undermine the claims of the political and social elite.  The story that our elites are somehow ‘responsible’ for a large part of the world around us – as politicians, as capitalists, as the military - becomes preposterous.  

As long as the concentration of hard political and military power merely reflected the concentration of so-called ‘soft’ forms of informational power it could always be opposed in terms of justice, but perhaps not in terms of its suitability.  This is no longer the case and the loss of mystery endured by forms of political concentration seems to mirror the loss of aura Benjamin identifies in his own period.  Resultantly the continuance of forms of political power that have remained inviolate to the cultural changes around them strikes the human subject as a gross, and unsustainable, indignity.  One is reminded of how Alexis de Tocqueville’s depiction of the French nobility’s access to privilege-without-responsibility chimes with the Occupy movement’s anger at global finance;

Picture to yourself, I beg, the French peasant of the eighteenth century….in order to purchase, he is bound, in the first place, to pay a tax, not to the government, but to some neighbours of his, who have no more authority, and no more to do with public business than he…..The largest part of the income of his little estate goes to the same parties in the shape of rents…. Let him do what he like, he can not but meet at every step of his life these same neighbours, who interfere with his enjoyments, impede his work, consume his produce….Picture, if you can, the condition, the wants, the character, the passions of such a man, and estimate the store of hatred and envy he is laying up in his heart.”15

The assault upon the concentration of political power within elites is a cultural phenomenon that not only affects states and corporations but is also recognised by them.  Governments have been keen to embrace new technologies as way to engage their citizens and utilize the distributive capacities they possess.  The United States Department of Defense has, for example, started using soldier’s own mobile phones to deliver training to its armed forces.  The Headstart language survival kit, which forms the basis of our recent work The Opera, utilises digital video avatars of military personnel as well as native speaking civilians in iPod format.  Developed for US soldiers prior to their deployment in non-English speaking countries, it is a phrasebook designed to give a basic command of languages currently including Dari, Pashto, Korean, Farsi, Arabic, Russian, Uzbek and Chinese.  Not surprisingly it is very unlike the tourist phrasebooks with which most people are familiar. Phrases such as “Follow our orders” or  “We are here to help the Iraqi people” or “ Do not move or the American Soldier will kill you” are clearly unique to their purpose. The Opera’s narrative arc is constructed from a selection of these phrases and presents the story of a man who is arrested and interrogated by an occupying military force. For our part we sought to understand, or perhaps more accurately occupy, the aesthetic language of this military and political construct.16  After all you’ve got to buy a ticket if you want to hi-jack a plane.  One aspect of this was to use autotune software to make the digital avatars sing their lines.  This gesture being, for us, fundamental to an understanding of the phrasebook as a repository of values that are both propagandist and aspirational and which serve to aestheticize the political and the ideological.
 
The straightforward nature of The Opera’s narrative is set against the multi-lingual quality of the source material.  Thus the question “What city is this?” receives the multiple response “This city is Bogata/Khandahar/Pyeongyang/Tehran/Shen Zhen”. The multi-lingual nature of the work finds an echo in real world situations not too distant from the ideological space that The Opera explores. Its not unusual in an online multiplayer game like Halo (which allows users operating soldier avatars to communicate with one another via headsets) to hear several languages being spoken.  Indeed its one of the places in our current world where you might find American and Chinese speakers shooting at or alongside each other in an imaginary space of virtual contest.  Of course training programmes like Headstart are deliberately modeled on computer games in the first place and as such its not surprising that we might find qualities within language learning software that echo those present in online shooting games. In both instances military fantasy forms the material nature of the world that is being explored.

This quality of ideological fantasy is exemplified by the way in which certain phrases describe not only points of verbal exchange (like interrogation) but also imply imagined political and social situations – ones which do not exist in our current world but which are proper to a kind of military-political dreaming.  A phrase like “We are looking for weapons that are being used to hurt Chinese and coalition forces” belongs not to the realm of warfare but to a state of occupation – in this case the occupation of mainland China by the American military.  And, if the Americans fantasize about occupying China then they are taking the first steps to realising that dream – the rehearsal of these lines as the prelude to a performance.  Occupation as such is preceded by language.  The violence that underpins this movement – from fantasy to brute actuality - is formulated as a total world where the fantasy is in a continuum with its potential manifestation. Thus the speaking avatars of the phrasebook are complete not only in their automated speech but also in the wider visual context in which they are located. You don’t just talk your way into control - you see it in advance – prefiguring your victory in an act of sympathetic magic. 

It seems we are living in a time when there is a palpable relationship between the act of dreaming and the act of occupation.  It is the psychological space created by the dislocations of globalisation that provides the terrain within which these dreams can be rehearsed.  On the one hand we have a military-political complex dreaming of occupying foreign territory whilst on the other groups of protesters giving voice to their dreams of a more democratic global society through occupations of sites they associate with its current malaise. Whilst the global connectedness of this protest movement is one of the elements that make it appear novel we should not ignore the fact that a strategy of occupation is pertinent to both sides of this divide – between those who wield power and those who suffer from its effects.  In Tahrir Square, Cairo, in Puerta del Sol, Madrid and around Wall Street, New York the retaking of public space is the tangible manifestation of a kind of dreaming.  The condition of resource asymmetry between a military occupation and a protest camp in a business district should not blind us to the innate symmetry of desire between those two actors.  For neither is concerned with the preservation of the status quo – rather we are seeing a barricade being erected between those who look towards a post-capitalist society typified by distributed forms and those who wish to further concentrate authority within a globalised capitalist aristocracy.  If one recognizes the mutually exclusive quality of these competing dreams then it becomes clear that the conflict between them will only become wider and deeper.

Notes
1	Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York; Schocken Books, 1951).
2	Eric Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolutions, 1789-1845 (London; Penguin Books, 1963).
3	“Syrian regime mounts forces to launch all-out assault on Homs”, The Independent, 12 December 2011, accessed 15 December 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-regime-mounts-forces-to-launch-allout-assault-on-homs-6276053.html.
4	Alex Seitz-Wald, “Cheney credits Iraq War for helping to start Arab Spring”, Think Progress, 31 August 2011, accessed 16 December 2011, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/08/31/308769/cheney-arab-spring-iraq.
5	“List of countries by income equality”, Wikipedia, accessed 28 December 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​List_of_countries_by_income_equality​).
6	Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level  (London; Penguin Books, 2010).
7	“Human Development Report 2011, Sustainability and Equality: A Better Future for All,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed 27 December 2011, 35. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/download.
8	ibid
9	Walter Benjamin, “Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, (London; Jonathon Cape, 1970), 234.
10	ibid
11 	op cit, 233.
12	op cit, 234.	
13	Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (London; Rebel Press/Aim Publications, 1987), 60.
14	“Piers Morgan Tonight, Interview with Beyonce”, CNN, 27 June 2011, accessed 25 December 2011, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1106/27/pmt.01.html (​http:​/​​/​transcripts.cnn.com​/​TRANSCRIPTS​/​1106​/​27​/​pmt.01.html​).
15	Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and Revolution (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1856), 48-49.
16	Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed 31 December 2011, http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=occupy (​http:​/​​/​etymonline.com​/​index.php?term=occupy​).  The dictionary reveals that during the 16th–17th century the word occupy served as a euphemism for sexual intercourse.  Florio’s 1598 English/Italian dictionary also lists ‘occupy’ as a synonym for to fuck, a facsimile of which is available at http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/florio1598/160.html (​http:​/​​/​www.pbm.com​/​~lindahl​/​florio1598​/​160.html​).


